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Moti Mizrahi has argued that Thomas Kuhn does not have a good argument for the 
incommensurability of successive scientific paradigms. With Rouse, Andersen, and 
others, I defend a view on which Kuhn primarily was trying to explain scientific 
practice in Structure. Kuhn, like Hilary Putnam, incorporated sociological and 
psychological methods into his history of science. On Kuhn’s account, the education and 
initiation of scientists into a research tradition is a key element in scientific training 
and in his explanation of incommensurability between research paradigms. The first 
part of this paper will explain and defend my reading of Kuhn. The second part will 
probe the extent to which Kuhn’s account can be supported, and the extent to which it 
rests on shaky premises. That investigation will center on Moti Mizrahi’s project, which 
aims to transform the Kuhnian account of science and of its history. While I do defend a 
modified kind of incommensurability, I agree that the strongest version of Kuhn’s 
account is steadfastly local and focused on the practice of science.   
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1 I would like to thank Moti Mizrahi for his kind invitation to contribute to this volume, and for the provocative and 
compelling questions he has raised. James Collier first invited me to respond to Mizrahi’s work in the SERRC, and 
this was a first occasion to think about these questions. My own work has benefited in large measure from the 
nuanced and well argued contributions of Vasso Kindi and James Marcum to the exchange with Mizrahi. Barry 
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helped me to craft clearer descriptions of them. Alan Richardson made incisive comments on inchoate versions of 
those descriptions. Some of the research for this paper was supported by, and done during a visit to, Martin Kusch’s 




Moti Mizrahi has argued that Thomas Kuhn does not have a good argument for the 
incommensurability of successive scientific paradigms. With Rouse, Andersen, and others, I 
defend a view on which Kuhn primarily was trying to explain scientific practice in Structure. 
Kuhn, like Hilary Putnam, incorporated sociological and psychological methods into his 
history of science. On Kuhn’s account, the education and initiation of scientists into a research 
tradition is a key element in scientific training and in his explanation of incommensurability 
between research paradigms. The first part of this paper will explain and defend my reading of 
Kuhn. The second part will probe the extent to which Kuhn’s account can be supported, and 
the extent to which it rests on shaky premises. That investigation will center on Moti 
Mizrahi’s project, which aims to transform the Kuhnian account of science and of its history. 
While I do defend a modified kind of incommensurability, I agree that the strongest version of 
Kuhn’s account is steadfastly local and focused on the practice of science.   
Images of Science 
Science may move through time by gathering results and facts, and developing increasingly 
sophisticated methods for dealing with them. Scientists may become better over time at 
describing, understanding, and explaining the phenomena they encounter. Those phenomena 
are real and publicly available, and successive scientific theories hone in on increasingly 
accurate analyses and predictions of their properties and behavior.  
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions unsettles this image of science.  Kuhn 
begins by asserting that the behavior of historians of science cannot be explained on a 
cumulative picture of science. Historians may attempt to reconstruct science’s past on the 
assumption that science is a cumulative, continuous practice. But that assumption quickly 
becomes a hypothesis, which is falsified as the historians dig deeper.  
Kuhn cites comprehensive historical studies of research traditions in optics, electromagnetism, 
and related fields, by Alexandre Koyré and numerous others, which reveal breaks and 
discontinuities in the description of scientific practice revealed by its history. 2  Those 
discontinuities are found in the behavior and practice of the scientists who were working at 
the time. Kuhn thus defends two hypotheses: the first about scientific practice, and the second 
about the behavior of historians of that practice. In both cases, I will argue, his aim is to 
describe, and then to explain, human behavior.  
Kuhn constructs a framework with which to explain scientific practice in the past, intended to 
extend to scientific practice generally. According to that framework, most science is essentially 
conservative, in the sense that it preserves the achievements that are taken as models for 
scientific work. Scientists are trained in a way of approaching problems and puzzles that 
ossifies great scientific achievements, turning them into the skeleton of a research tradition. 
Flesh is put on the bones by laboring researchers.  
Scientists in the wake of a great scientific achievement are trained to rebuild the skeleton of 
that achievement, before they begin to fill out that skeleton as mature researchers. Examples 
of scientific achievements on the scale Kuhn analyzes are Lavoisier’s Chemistry, Newton’s 
Principia, and Franklin’s Electricity. Thousands of scientists of the past have been trained to 
reproduce the achievements of these books, so that the strategies found therein become 
working scientific instruments.  
                                                
2 “Most of the sources cited in Structure are sources in the history of science (see Wray 2015). To be precise, 60% of 
the sources cited in Structure are in the history of science” (Wray 2016, 10). 
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According to Kuhn’s original definition in the second chapter of Structure, a paradigm is a 
scientific achievement that becomes a textbook. 3  Books like Principia, Chemistry, and 
Electricity lay down firm results, but are also open-ended, so that scientists can find intriguing 
problems to solve using those results and achievements as a springboard. A young scientist 
doesn’t just learn established theory by being taught from Newton’s Principia. That scientist 
learns how to become an active researcher, how to approach problems, how to think about and 
represent the phenomena under investigation, and how to use instruments to conduct 
experiments.  
What many researchers miss in Kuhn’s definition are the link to scientific practice, and the 
link to teaching science.4  A “paradigm” often is treated as if it’s identical to a “background 
theory”, and then paradigms are fed into the machine of confirmation, testing, and assessment 
of theories. But Kuhn wanted paradigms to be about future research, and to be linked to 
scientific practice.5 When a paradigm guides scientific practice in the right way, it makes 
scientific research and progress possible, and it goes beyond accepted theory.  
Scientists who learn how to use a scientific achievement as a playbook are doing “normal 
science”. Kuhn’s description of normal science as conservative and dogmatic is notorious.6 
Critics complained right away that normal science only extends a paradigm that’s taken as 
given, and does not subject that paradigm to rigorous testing. On Popper’s view, for instance, 
if a research practice does not include at least the possibility of falsifying the theory in the 
background or the hypotheses under investigation, it is not scientific.  
However, paradigms, in the 1962 Structure, are neither theories nor hypotheses. They are 
model scientific achievements. Strictly speaking, a theory cannot be a paradigm in the above 
sense. Theories can be tested precisely because they contain sets of assertions that have fixed, 
knowable truth values. In this sense, theories are closed.  If an assertion of a theory does not 
have a truth value that can be assessed in principle, or if that assertion cannot be proven, the 
assertion is not a result of the theory.  Thus, if Newton’s Principia contained only a theory or 
theories, it could not be a paradigm. Principia is a paradigm because, along with the stable 
results it states, the work implicitly expresses a new way of doing science. Newton’s 
achievement results from a novel orientation to scientific practice, an orientation that can be 
learned and can be the source of a tradition of research.  
In 1959, Kuhn described the interplay between tradition and innovation as the “essential 
tension” without which science cannot operate. The essential tension is the source of the 
theoretical posit at issue in a recent exchange between Moti Mizrahi (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), 
James Marcum (2015), Vasso Kindi (2015), and myself (Patton 2015b): the 
incommensurability of successive paradigms.   
 
                                                
3 By Masterson’s count (1970), Kuhn uses “paradigm” in twenty-one ways in Structure. And later, Kuhn admits 
that his thinking changed. But this is the first clear definition Kuhn gives in Structure. Brorson and Andersen 
(2001) explain the early and continued influence of Fleck’s “textbook science” on Kuhn, from the 1950s onward.  
4 Those who do put emphasis on practice include Rouse (1998, 2013), Andersen (2000), Brorson and Andersen (2001, 
including an excellent bibliography of related work), Hoyningen-Huene (1993, 2002), Richardson (2002), and others. 
As Rouse (2013, 59) says, “Kuhn’s challenge to received philosophical views has been domesticated by reading him 
as offering an alternative conception of scientific knowledge. Kuhn is better understood as rejecting knowledge-
centric accounts altogether, in favor of understanding the practice of research”. 
5 Richardson (2002) has referred to paradigms as giving rules of a game – paradigms guide scientific research. To 
be sure, Kuhn argued that no comprehensive rules that govern problem solving (and guarantee problems can be 
solved) can be given ahead of time. But paradigms can give rules for how to approach those problems.  




On Kuhn’s account, the only reason for a working scientist to question a paradigm comes when 
there is a persistent anomaly: when experiments set up using the paradigm begin to fail, when 
the paradigm fails to solve new problems, and so on. The first task of a working scientist is to 
resolve anomalies within the paradigm. If that fails, then the scientific community must – 
reluctantly – find a way to conceive of a new paradigm to resolve persistent anomalies.  
One puzzling feature of Kuhn’s “essential tension” is the dual role of the architects of a 
paradigm. On Kuhn’s account, paradigm architects are treated with reverence by the 
generations who follow them. The main lines of their research programs are traced and re-
traced by generations of scientists. We might think of graduate students learning to reproduce 
Fourier transforms, or learning to use Hamiltonians in simplified cases, as monks copying 
texts in a scriptorium. Even more profoundly, scientists being trained in a paradigm learn how 
to think about and how to conceive of scientific phenomena through this training, including 
how to describe target phenomena so they are tractable by scientific methods.7  
On the other hand, it is only a matter of time before any given architect of a paradigm loses 
his place in the pantheon. No program of normal science is immune to persistent anomaly.  It 
is an axiom of Kuhn’s account8 that no paradigm can deal with all the phenomena. The works 
of Aristotle famously were treated by the Scholastics with reverence. But once prominent 
cases were made that the effectiveness of the Aristotelian paradigm was limited, Aristotle had 
to be displaced in a revolution. Kuhn’s account turns Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein into 
warring Greek gods.  
Kuhn’s picture of the history of science replaces serene continuity with political upheaval. A 
paradigm is constructed only when persistent anomaly dogs the old paradigm: when there is a 
recognized crisis. The only way to deal with crisis is to change the fundamental approach to 
the problem. Another approach must be achieved that changes how scientists interact with the 
phenomena in practice.  
Scientific revolutions are best explained as practical decisions, either from inside or outside an 
existing paradigm.9 Scientists will change their paradigm only when forced to do so, according 
to Kuhn. When they do, it is because the existing paradigm no longer works. Scientists have 
been trained to approach the phenomena in a certain structured and artificial way, a way not 
limited to accepting the claims of the background theory. The approach may involve being 
trained into practical ways of modeling the phenomena and ways of setting up experiments, 
for instance, practical know-how that Michael Polanyi calls “tacit knowledge”.10  Scientists are 
trained as well in what Ludwik Fleck calls “vademecum science” and Kuhn calls “textbook 
science”, in contrast with “journal science”.11 Textbook science is the image of science sketched 
above, in which students are initiated into their scientific community’s way of approaching the 
phenomena and of solving problems. As Hoyningen-Huene puts it, this training even gives 
                                                
7 See Andersen (2000). 
8 Perhaps unacknowledged.  
9 See Patton (2015b). 
10 Timmins (2013) weighs the allegation that Kuhn plagiarized ideas from Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, and the 
broader question of Polanyi’s influence on Structure.  
11 See Brorson and Andersen 2001, 110. Wray observes, “Kuhn refers to Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a 
Scientific Fact in the preface to Structure, noting that it was instrumental in helping him see that his own project 
was tied to ‘the sociology of the scientific community’” (Kuhn 2012 / 1962 xli; Wray 2016, 4). 
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students “access to the (region of the) phenomenal world relevant to the work of his or her 
community”.12  
Once students have been trained, they are set loose on the world as researchers, and, again, 
the phenomena are not always tractable by a given paradigm. Researchers will find anomalies 
and misfits in practice, most of which can be resolved. But if a crisis occurs, and then a 
revolution, then there must be a “paradigm shift”. Paradigm shifts, for Kuhn, involve changes 
to the conceptual and semantic categories in play. A new paradigm may even mean that 
scientists educated in the former tradition may need to “re-educate” themselves to perceive the 
world differently.13  
The earlier Kuhn of Structure presented incommensurability as a kind of practical 
impossibility. Imagine a scientist, Alessandra, has been trained in the fluid theory of 
electricity.14 Alessandra knows how to work with an early kind of battery called a Leyden jar, 
a glass jar filled with a fluid (acid) with immersed wires. As Alessandra has been trained to 
conceive of it, the fluid is necessary to produce a current across the wires. Now imagine 
Alessandra is in her lab, looking for a battery to use in her experiment. There is a stack of dry 
cell batteries in the corner, which are composed of a chemical paste and metal contacts. But 
she looks past them, and says, “There aren't any batteries here.” To her, a dry cell can’t be a 
battery, because there is no fluid involved.  
For Alessandra to be able to use the dry cells to generate a current for her experiment, or to 
draw any conclusions from that experiment, she’ll need to change her way of working with 
electricity. That need for change to a scientist’s way of working is a practical result of 
incommensurability: former paradigms clash with practices, claims, or structures that emerge 
under new paradigms. Scientists can conduct certain experiments or prove certain results 
within one paradigm and not another. The paradigms can be compared to each other, but 
there’s no common measure that reduces one to the other.15 Certainly, it’s true that a scientist 
can change her way of thinking and her way of working. But she cannot work exclusively 
within an unrevised fluid electricity paradigm and work with dry cells successfully at the 
same time.   
The Problem with Incommensurability 
The continuous explanation of science that Kuhn rejects has two attractive, connected 
features: continuity and realism. These features are central to contemporary realist accounts. 
Since scientists are referring to the same things, their descriptions and explanations have a 
secure basis for comparison over time. The history of science has a foundation of reference to 
real, publicly available phenomena. The behavior of scientists can be explained in these terms 
as well. Scientists make the inferences they do, and construct the theories they do, because 
their experiments and investigations put them in causal contact with objects and systems with 
stable properties.16 The statements of scientific theories are intended as descriptions of those 
properties, and, when they fall short, they are corrected when the evidence is updated.17 
                                                
12 Hoyningen-Huene 1993, 187; cited in Brorson and Andersen 110, who link this notion to their analysis of Fleck.  
13 Kuhn 2012/1962, 112; also see Hoyningen-Huene 2002, which also discusses Feyerabend in this connection.  
14 This is a simplified form of an example Kuhn uses often.  
15  Massimi (2015, 84-86) provides a detailed, more technical analysis of one of Kuhn’s examples of 
incommensurability: Galileo’s and Aristotle’s treatment of falling bodies, before and after Galileo’s discovery of the 
law of free fall. 
16  A paraphrase of the commitments of causal descriptivists, including Kripke; for a recent discussion and 
references to further work see Patton 2015a.  
17 A paraphrase of a classic conception of scientific realism provided by Bas van Fraassen: “Science aims to give us, 
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The advantages of continuity and realism are palpable when there are rival approaches to the 
same phenomena. It is straightforward to say that theories compete to be the best descriptions 
and explanations of interesting phenomena. Moreover, we can explain scientists’ behavior by 
rationally reconstructing 18  how they react to novel evidence, counterexamples, the 
development of new analytic tools, and the like. Such a reconstruction may be easier if we 
think of scientists using rival approaches as trying to measure the same things using different 
yardsticks.  
Ever since Kuhn published Structure, there have been criticisms of the notion of 
incommensurability, and of Kuhn’s related claim that paradigm shifts are not rationally 
reconstructible.19 Fundamentally, one might deny Kuhn’s thesis of the “priority of paradigms”. 
We might paraphrase the priority thesis as the assertion that a scientist’s way of working with 
the phenomena, “the set of results provable, puzzles solvable, and propositions cogently 
formulable” by a scientist, depends on the paradigm under which she is working.20  
Denying the priority thesis has a number of apparently salutary results, related to the 
advantages of convergent realism. Paradigm shifts become rationally reconstructible, at least 
in principle, because there is a perspective from outside any given paradigm from which to 
evaluate competing paradigms. The incommensurability of successive paradigms is 
undermined as well, for the same reason. It is no longer impossible in principle to find a 
common measure with which to evaluate competing paradigms. The threat of “Kuhn loss,” in 
which results achieved in one paradigm are not recoverable in a successive paradigm, no 
longer looms over science.  
By these means, we regain an image of science and its practice that preserves a robust 
continuity consistent with convergent or, as Mizrahi has defended recently, relative realism.21 
The continuity involved could be continuity of empirical results and practices, or of equations 
and structural relationships. An essential assertion of many of Kuhn’s critics is that there will 
always be a common measure between any two paradigms, according to which results and 
assertions of one can be recovered in the next.22  Scientists need not find themselves blinkered 
by their training into seeing the world as it is structured by an artificial approach to problems.  
Denying the thesis of the priority of paradigms also removes a barrier Kuhn had placed in the 
way of making the following assertions: 
1.  In principle, there could be an epistemic standard that governs scientific practice and 
theory, in the past and in the present alike.  
2.  The evidence for scientific claims is publicly available, inferences from such claims are 
based on fundamental rational or logical principles, and thus scientific research does 
not require initiation into a scientific élite.  
                                                                                                                                                            
in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like: and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief 
that it is true” (1980, 8, emphasis removed). 
18 A phrase used by Lakatos, which he ascribes to Carnap. The picture described here is not the logical empiricist 
one, even though some details (like the public availability of phenomena) are found in that tradition.  
19  Lakatos argued that paradigm shifts are rationally reconstructible (see, e.g., his chapter in Lakatos and 
Musgrave 1970). Patton (2012) argues for that claim in a qualified way based on Laudan’s “context of pursuit”, and 
provides a bibliography of work on this subject.  
20 Patton 2015b, 57. 
21 See Mizrahi (2013). To be sure, Kuhn’s critics aren’t all realists. I have to simplify a vast literature in this 
discussion.  
22 The work of Friedman (2008, 2001), for instance, analyzes successive paradigms in physics in which one serves as 
a limiting case of another, which preserves “retrospective rationality”. Paradigms are nested like Russian dolls, so 
that a later, more comprehensive paradigm can explain earlier ones.  
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3.   Scientists work in a common world and with publicly available phenomena.  
It is a historical irony that these or similar assertions were characteristic of the Unity of 
Science movement, in whose International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Structure first 
appeared (Carnap, Morris, and Neurath 1970). As Wray (2016) notes, in a 1963 letter to Kuhn, 
Marjorie Grene “expresses surprise at where the book is published. ‘It seems a bit of a joke 
that it should appear in the Unity of Science Series, of all places.’”23 What’s funny is that many 
of Kuhn’s conclusions undermine the tenets of the Unity of Science program, and vice versa.  
For instance, an account of scientific observation via Otto Neurath’s protocol propositions 
(Protokollsätze) that operationalize publicly available observations seems to be ruled out by 
Kuhn. Kuhn’s scientific observation is theory laden and highly structured. 24  Conversely, 
Neurath’s program of Protokollsätze supports an account of scientific observation that would 
put the brakes on Structure from the beginning. As Massimi (2015) has argued in detail, Kuhn 
argues at least for the semantic mind-dependence of scientific phenomena.25  
Thus, we might think that Kuhn is arguing that researchers in rival paradigms are unable to 
understand each other in principle, not just  disinclined to do so.  They ‘work in different 
worlds’, they speak different languages, and they are unable to cross the gulf of understanding.  
 
Paradigm Inadequacy and Super-Paradigms 
In fact, we can say more. The following is an often unacknowledged premise of Structure: 
Paradigm Inadequacy: Not all phenomena are accessible, and not all scientific results 
are provable, from any single paradigm.  
The careful work of Brorson and Andersen (2001) and of Hoyningen-Huene (1993) provides 
detail to the account according to which Kuhnian researchers working within a paradigm gain 
access to phenomena only from within a given paradigm, where that paradigm involves 
training and an artificial, structured approach to investigation, experiment, and inference.26 
Kuhn draws not only on the analysis of “vademecum” or “textbook” science from Fleck, but 
also on the work of James Bryant Conant and the Harvard science studies curriculum (Wray 
2016), on the notion of “tacit knowledge” from Polanyi (Timmins 2013), and on related notions 
from Toulmin and Foucault.  
                                                
23 Marjorie Grene to Kuhn, September 25, 1963; details in references. 
24 Of course, it’s possible that Kuhn would allow for a ground level of observation that does not depend on theory or 
on a given practical approach. But his account of scientific observation is not at that ground level.  
25 Massimi makes clear that Kuhn does not argue for the ontological mind-dependence of the phenomena. Still, as 
Clark Glymour has recalled, and Norton conveys, “Clark and Hartry Field were having lunch in the cafeteria when 
Hartry remarked on Kuhn's curious view. When Thomson made his discovery with cathode rays (or however it was 
done), that's when Kuhn believes electrons popped into existence. Did Kuhn really think that?! At that moment, 
Kuhn just happened to walk by. Clark stopped him and asked. ‘Yeah, of course,’ Kuhn replied and he walked away,” 
(Norton 2012). As Norton notes, this exchange does not answer the question of precisely what Kuhn meant. I would 
note, in particular, he may have thought the specific semantic kind, “electron”, began to exist when it was 
experimentally demonstrable, rather than that the physical referent of “electron” did not exist. Massimi provides an 
argument for a view resembling the former assertion.  
26 Moti Mizrahi commented on a draft of this paper that this point raises the question of how science could ever 
have started. For instance, when the “first astronomers” looked at the night sky, would they have had access to a 
paradigm?  In Structure, Kuhn identifies “pre-paradigm science” as the initial phase of research (this idea is 
discussed throughout the work, including on pages 20, 48, 61, 162, and 178 of the edition cited. Pre-paradigm 
scientists are still working within an agreed-upon conceptual and practical framework, however. On the reading 
discussed here, it is that framework that allows them to have access to structured “phenomena” and not bare sense 
data, for instance.  
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None of this work provides sufficient evidence for Kuhn’s thesis of paradigm inadequacy. It 
can be true that researchers gain access to phenomena only from within a given paradigm, but 
false that no single paradigm provides access to all the phenomena. Without the premise of 
paradigm inadequacy, though, many of Kuhn’s assertions lose their force. Scientific 
revolutions, and the resulting incommensurability, would be temporary phenomena: mere 
inconveniences along the way to developing an even more powerful paradigm that dominates 
the old and the new approaches.  
Kuhn might observe that no single paradigm ever has provided access to all scientific 
phenomena or to a way of solving all extant scientific puzzles. Kuhn could respond quite 
simply that his account is intended as a description and an explanation of the scientific past 
and present, which makes sense of scientific practice. The history of scientific practice is a 
history of warring paradigms, not of peaceful agreement.  
Technically, paradigm inadequacy is a falsifiable claim. If someone were to develop a semantic 
and practical magic bullet, a scientific framework from which all scientific results are 
recoverable and which is perfectly transparent to all forms of scientific research both formal 
and experimental, that would falsify it. Scientists trained in a super-paradigm would be able 
to do research in any domain using the paradigm as a guide for their research; they would find 
that results in that domain immediately apply to phenomena in related domains; and the 
super-paradigm would show them how to use results in one domain to solve related puzzles 
elsewhere.27  
Facts about the practice and development of science require a super-paradigm, a way of 
solving problems that works for every science, to pursue this way of falsifying the claim of 
paradigm inadequacy. As David Hilbert has emphasized, questions within physics are 
suggested by progress in mathematics, and vice versa. It is well known that  approaches to 
problems in chemistry affect practice in biology, and vice versa. And so on. Without a super-
paradigm, there is always the possibility that a paradigm in a single given domain will fail 
when that domain is extended or drawn differently, to include problems and approaches 
within another science. 
Fortunately for them, Kuhn’s critics don’t need to achieve a super-paradigm. They can make 
one of two moves instead:28 
1. Question the evidence for paradigm inadequacy, even in the history of science.  
2. Argue against an assumption behind the premise: that a ‘single’ paradigm must be 
simple and not composite. If there always will be a bridge between successful 
paradigms, so that results in one can be assessed and re-derived from the perspective of 
another, that is the practical equivalent of a single super-paradigm.  
Many of Kuhn’s critics (Lakatos, Friedman, and so on) have taken option 2. Mizrahi (2015a 
and forthcoming) takes both options, unifying the fronts against Kuhn. He argues, in a 
forthcoming work, that it is not true that the history of science is a “graveyard” of past 
theories, as Kuhn, Laudan, and others have asserted. While not formulated explicitly in these 
terms, this is option 1: to deny that the history of science is a history of warring paradigms, 
and to assert that science displays an underlying continuity.  
                                                
27 It is entertaining to think in more detail about what a super-paradigm could be. For instance, robot scientists 
equipped with supercomputers might be the only Earthly beings equipped to carry out scientific research under 
such a paradigm. But I will leave these speculations aside, reluctantly, for now.   
28 There are more possible moves, of course, but these are prominent ones.  
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Stephen Toulmin has argued that Kuhn’s history of science is lacking, on different but related 
grounds.   
with experience, it has become clear to political historians that nothing is achieved by 
saying “and then there was a revolution,” as though that exempted one from the need 
to give any historical analysis of a more explicit kind. To do only that is not to perform 
the historian’s proper intellectual task, but to shirk it.29 
Toulmin objects to Kuhn’s depiction of the history of science as displaying, not continuity, but 
radical breaks. Telling the history of science requires an adequate and comprehensive 
description and explanation of events. Appealing to a ‘revolution’ is a trick. You can explain 
what happens up to the time of the revolution (at a time t1, say) and what happens after t1. 
But you do not consider yourself responsible for explaining the break at t1, or the relationships 
between the ‘revolution’ at t1 and what happens before and after it. That, says Toulmin, is bad 
history. Toulmin’s objection undermines the evidential base for Kuhn’s assertion that the 
history of science is punctuated with breaks and revolutions. For Toulmin, the “evidence” for 
this assertion comes from failures of historical rigor: the historian finds a gap she cannot 
explain, and hypothesizes that this gap is in the history instead of in her explanation of the 
history.  
Mizrahi’s and Toulmin’s objections point to a unifying theme in the criticisms of Kuhn, a way 
to unify (1) and (2) above. Understanding the history of science requires, not just describing 
events, but explaining why they happened. That requires a standard, a common measure, that 
spans the history of science.  
One popular strategy for providing such a measure is to argue that scientists in successive 
paradigms are referring to the same things, which amounts to a denial of Kuhn’s thesis of 
“taxonomic incommensurability”. 30  For instance, Leplin and others have defended 
“methodological realism,” which includes the claim that scientific practice makes sense only if 
scientists understand themselves to be working with real things that in principle are 
accessible to other scientists.31  
I do not believe that there is a global argument for the essential or universal 
incommensurability of rival scientific theories (see Patton 2015b, 2012). To that extent, I 
believe that Mizrahi (2015a) and I are in agreement. But, as should be clear by now, I do not 
agree that a paradigm is restricted to a theory that consists of assertions with truth values 
that depend on existence and properties of the referents of their terms. Instead, I think a 
Kuhnian paradigm is a guide to practice within a scientific community. The interesting facet 
of Kuhnian incommensurability is thus that it is practical and local and, as I will conclude, 




                                                
29 Toulmin 1967, 84. 
30 As Sankey (1993, 1997) makes clear, Kuhn’s notions of incommensurability change over time. Marcum (2015, 
153) connects Kuhn’s later emphasis on “changes in the lexical taxonomy of a scientific specialty” with Kuhn’s 
“Darwinian” picture of science, so that “scientific progress is analogous to biological speciation, with 
incommensurability as the isolation mechanism”. 
31 Leplin (1986, 33) gives the example of Millikan’s oil drop experiments: “if we describe what Millikan was doing 
without mentioning electrons, we seem to impute to him an unaccountable, indeed perverse interest in the amount 
of electric charge with which X-radiation will endow an oil droplet. What was the experiment for if not to determine 
the charge of the electron?” 
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Scientific Practice and Local Explanation 
Kuhn shifted from his earlier emphasis on practical incommensurability, in Structure, to an 
emphasis on taxonomic incommensurability in later work.32  In Structure, however, Kuhn 
places the main emphasis on practice, and thus on the account that I sketched in the opening 
sections of this paper. On page 103, where he introduces the term “incommensurable”, Kuhn 
writes:33 
paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are directed not only to nature but 
also back upon the science that produced them. They are the source of the methods, 
problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community 
at any given time. As a result, the reception of a new paradigm often necessitates a 
redefinition of the corresponding science. Some old problems may be relegated to 
another science or declared entirely ‘unscientific’. Others that were previously non-
existent or trivial may, with a new paradigm, become the very archetypes of significant 
scientific achievement.  And as the problems change, so, often, does the standard that 
distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word 
game, or mathematical play. 
The last three examples are suggestive. What counts as a scientific problem? What counts as a 
solution? What is trivial, and what is interesting? What is a clever solution to a merely 
intellectual puzzle, and what is a substantial contribution, a real scientific achievement? 
Kuhn refers to these aspects of local, communal scientific practice when he first defines 
incommensurability. Shifting paradigms can result in shifting community standards: what 
was an uninteresting problem can become interesting, and what was scientific can be seen as 
un-scientific. Within some traditions of natural philosophy, theology is continuous with 
physics, because the laws of nature are willed by God. Descartes thought his account of God 
was a necessary support for his account of the laws of nature, which in turn is central to his 
natural philosophy. He would not have divided the two pursuits, either. But someone in the 
contemporary context who studies theology is not considered to be pursuing the science of 
physics as it is done at MIT.34 That is a sociological fact about the way we organize scientific 
pursuit, the way disciplines are divided, and the way we divide up problems among 
researchers. But it is also a practical way that Cartesian natural philosophy and current 
research paradigms differ.  
Contemporary scientists do talk about God or the divine, but arguably they do not count 
results that are only statements about the existence or properties of God as the sole basis for 
demonstrations of results within physics. There are ways to interpret cosmology, for instance, 
that appeal to the divine. But it is likely that a contemporary physicist who submitted a proof 
to Physical Review Letters that depended only on statements about the nature and attributes 
of God would have that paper rejected as outside the scope of the journal.  Researchers in 
Cartesian and Newtonian natural philosophy presented such proofs to the scientific 
community, and they were accepted as proofs within natural philosophy.  
Note that Kuhn refers this practical result of paradigm shifts first and foremost to scientific 
practice, to choices within the scientific community. There is nothing necessary, much less 
                                                
32 As Sankey and Marcum have emphasized, in the works cited above.  
33 I am grateful to Alan Richardson for emphasizing this passage and its significance.  (He is, of course, not 
therefore responsible for my reading or use of the passage.)   
34 Intriguingly, in the contemporary context some realities of funding are pushing in the opposite direction, toward 
the questions that were considered by natural philosophers.    
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logically necessary, about it. When Laplace was asked about the place of God in his system of 
physics, he (allegedly) replied “I have no need of that hypothesis.” Laplace developed a 
scientific achievement, a system, and an approach that broke with the tradition of natural 
philosophy in  turning away from theological concerns. Laplace’s system differs from Descartes’ 
system in practice, in its results, and in its standards of explanation. For instance, Laplace’s 
laws of nature are not concerned with or founded on the divine essence or will, while Descartes’ 
are.35 
We cannot understand Laplace, or Descartes, properly if we understand them to be working 
with the same entities, problems, and questions. Both are doing physics. But Descartes 
considers physics to be continuous with theology, and considers problems about God’s essence 
and will to be central to solving problems for physics, including problems about the necessity 
of the laws of nature. Laplace sees himself as having no need of a theology that is continuous 
with his physics, and so he constructs a physical system that does not appeal to the existence 
of God or even include any assertions about God. Laplace does not consider problems about 
God’s essence and will to be problems in the domain of physics.  
Can we give a reason, a scientific reason, why Descartes was wrong to include God as a 
“hypothesis” in his system of physics? We can certainly argue that Laplace’s system is simpler, 
and thus argue on the basis of Ockham’s razor.36  Locally, we can judge Laplace’s system from 
Descartes’, and Descartes’ from Laplace’s. Neither allows for a knock-down argument, that the 
other must accept, why statements about the existence and attributes of God should or should 
not figure in physical proofs.  
On Kuhn’s account, an explanation of why a scientist takes certain problems seriously, and 
others not, may be based on scientific reasons of one kind or another, or it may be based on 
local facts about the development of a research tradition, including explanations of scientists’ 
behavior that depend on such local facts.  Such local, specific explanations of scientific practice 
are of value for the history and philosophy of science. Above all, Kuhn’s emphasis on textbook 
science and on the initiation of researchers into a specific, local tradition is salutary. It is a 
mistake simply to assume that scientists who have been trained differently will approach the 
phenomena in the same way, see the same problems as salient, and so on. We may not be able 
to understand events in the history of science properly if we do not pay attention to the 
training, pedagogy, and initiation of scientists.37  
Researchers are made, and they are made with difficulty. That much is familiar to any 
working scientist or mathematician. The practical analogue of the paradigm inadequacy thesis 
is that, as a local and practical matter, no scientist can solve every problem using her current 
scientific training. Kuhn’s practical account thus leads to the injunction that scientists should 
be aware of the existence of rival approaches, should learn about them, and should be aware of 
the limitations of their own approaches.  
To be sure, Kuhn himself was quite pessimistic about the prospects for enlightened science 
along these lines, arguing that scientists in his experience were dogmatic and blinkered.38 
                                                
35 I would like to thank Moti Mizrahi for pressing clarification of this discussion, which has improved the account.  
36 Anyone who tries this isn’t terribly familiar with Laplace’s system.  
37 Alan Richardson pointed out the salience of this question in the context of scientific practice. 
38 Steve Fuller (2000) has reproached Kuhn on this score, arguing that Kuhn, in his alliance with Conant, bolstered 
Cold War science through his conservatism about science (see also Wray 2016). While a full response is beyond the 
scope of this paper, I would note the following. Criticizing Kuhn for writing science as conservative and dogmatic is 
like asking Agatha Christie why she murdered all those people. Kuhn’s assertions that science is conservative are 
descriptive, not normative: Kuhn’s descriptions of dogmatic scientists are not flattering. For a more detailed and 
persuasive argument on this score, see Kindi (2003).  
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That does not, however, license global claims about the inability of researchers from rival or 
distinct paradigms to understand each other, or to work in a common world.  
Kuhn’s early work was criticized by philosophers who wished to see a more robust role for 
language and semantics in his view. Kuhn’s work was even “Sneedified”, as Damböck (2014) 
details, so that it fit into the formal, semantic tradition associated with Sneed and 
Stegmüller.39 Along the way, Kuhn’s statements about incommensurability came to be seen – 
even by Kuhn himself – as broad claims about lexical or taxonomic “speciation” between 
theories,40 and as limitations on the ability of scientists even to express their results using 
rival conceptual frameworks.  
Such developments are a shame, in my view. Kuhn’s original work did not restrict “paradigm” 
to “theoretical framework”, nor did he restrict the perspective of scientific practice to the 
content of propositions with a truth value. And it is mainly because Kuhn’s arguments in 
Structure are outside the semantic view, and focus instead on the practice of science, that they 
are interesting and fresh.  
Rather than reading Kuhn through the lens of semantic theorists like Quine, Davidson, or 
Sneed, I would urge reading Kuhn’s project in the lines of recent work on the “context of 
pedagogy” (Kaiser 2005, Richardson 2012, Woody 2004) and Hasok Chang’s emphasis on 
historical understanding (Chang 2010). It is a long-standing project in the history and 
philosophy of science to understand, not only what scientists take themselves to be saying, but 
also “what the devil scientists thought they were up to”.41 Understanding local practices in 
science, the importance of training and education, the salience of which problems researchers 
take to be compelling, and the shifts that take place as standards change with novel 
achievements and changes to the context, are all necessary to working out what scientists are 
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